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Abstract
In a standard search model I relax the assumption that agents know the distribution
of oﬀers and characterize the behavioral and welfare consequences of overconﬁdence.
Optimistic individuals search longer if they are equally stubborn and high oﬀers are
good news. Otherwise, the pessimists search longer. The welfare of unbiased individ-
uals is larger than that of overconﬁdent decision makers if the latter’s biases are large
and searchers stubborn. Otherwise, the overconﬁdent may be better oﬀ. Finally, I give
a testable implication of overconﬁdence and discuss applications and policy issues.
1 Introduction and Motivation
“Dozens of studies show that people generally overrate the chance of good events,
underrate the chance of bad events and are generally overconﬁdent about their
relative skill or prospects. For example, 90percent of American drivers in one
study thought they ranked in the top half of their demographic group in driving
skill” Camerer (1997)1
Despite the substantial evidence that overconﬁdence is pervasive, it has not received much
attention in economic modeling. Given the wide applicability of search models, I study the
implications of overconﬁdence in the search behavior of rational agents. To do so, I relax the
∗I am indebted to Charles Wilson for his guidance. I am grateful to Jean Pierre Benoît, Alberto Bisin,
Federico Echenique, Néstor Gandelman and Efe Ok for helpful comments.
†jmd228@nyu.edu
1I will not discuss this evidence here. See Carmerer (1997) for experimental and psychological references.
1usual assumption that the searchers know the true distribution of wage oﬀers and suppose
only that agents’ beliefs are derived from a prior over a set of possible distributions. Several
other authors have also studied search behavior when the distribution is not known. For
example, Kohn and Shavell (1974) proves the existence of an optimal policy for a very general
class of beliefs. Rothschild (1974) shows that, for a limited class of beliefs, the optimal policy
has the same properties as that in standard search models. Burdett and Vishwanath (1988)
proves that, if search costs are large, the reservation wage of workers decreases over time.
Bikhchandani and Sharma (1996) give suﬃcient conditions for searchers to follow reservation
wage policies. I address a diﬀerent set of issues.
This paper has three objectives. The ﬁrst is to establish the behavioral implications of
optimism. Bikhchandani and Sharma (1996) have shown that when there is learning, the
order of static optimism of two individuals may be reversed after observing the same informa-
tion. Thus, they say that one individual is more optimistic than another if he assigns higher
probabilities to high oﬀers after all sequences of observations. I adopt this deﬁnition of opti-
mism and show that it fails to predict optimistic behavior. That is, optimistic searchers may
accept oﬀers that pessimists reject. Thus, I ﬁnd conditions that guarantee that optimistic
individuals search longer than pessimists. Oﬀers have informational value because, as search
evolves, individuals learn about the unknown distribution. Suppose then that a low oﬀer
has a higher value than a high oﬀer, violating what I will call Monotonicity. In that case,
optimism may lead to a lower expected value of searching than pessimism. This, in turn,
yields shorter search times for the optimistic agent. The main result on behavior is that an
optimistic searcher samples longer than a pessimist, whenever one of them has monotonic
priors.
The second objective is to study the welfare implications of overconﬁdence. I ﬁnd condi-
tions under which overconﬁdent agents are worse oﬀ than unbiased searchers when welfare
is computed using the true wage oﬀer distribution. In this paper, an individual is overconﬁ-
dent if he believes that the distribution that generates the oﬀers is better than it really is. I
show that when searchers are not too patient, there are some overconﬁdent individuals who
obtain higher expected payoﬀs than some unbiased searchers. If agents have a degenerate
prior, being unbiased means knowing the true distribution. In that case, unbiased searchers
must be weakly better oﬀ than overconﬁdent decision makers. However, if priors are non-
degenerate, the comparison is not between an overconﬁdent individual and a searcher who
knows the truth, but between two searchers who are uncertain about the true distribution,
one of whom happens to be unbiased. Thus, at least in principle, there is the possibility
that an unbiased individual is worse oﬀ than an overconﬁdent searcher. In fact, there should
2be an unbiased decision maker who is worse oﬀ than an overconﬁdent individual. Along the
search process high oﬀers are accepted, so sampling continues only if oﬀers have been low.
Consequently, because priors are updated in each period, there is a tendency for beliefs to
become pessimistic. Therefore, searchers who were initially unbiased and continue sampling
today are likely to wrongfully accept a low oﬀer tomorrow. Slightly overconﬁdent searchers
are more immune to this kind of mistake. Since they are not too biased, they do not mis-
takenly reject oﬀers and, because they were originally optimistic, downward updating is not
so harmful.
My third objective is to study the conditions under which the behavior and welfare con-
sequences of overconﬁdence diminish over time. Since behavior and welfare are derived from
beliefs, this amounts to ﬁnding conditions under which the overconﬁdent individual’s true
average posterior approaches the true distribution. I show that, while unbiased priors remain
unbiased on average, overconﬁdent individuals may become pessimistic. If the true distrib-
ution allows only oﬀers that are “too” low according to the overconﬁdent decision maker’s
beliefs, he may become pessimistic after all oﬀers. This cannot happen with unbiased priors.
To ensure that overconﬁdent beliefs diminish over time and never become pessimistic, it
suﬃces to assume that there is an unbiased belief that is more pessimistic than the overcon-
ﬁdent. The condition is not trivial because it requires that the overconﬁdent prior remains
more optimistic than the unbiased after all sequences of draws. Then, the result follows
because unbiased priors are a martingale and a lower bound for more optimistic beliefs.
I conclude with a discussion of the testable implications of this model and of some appli-
cations and policy issues.
There are three kinds of theoretical works related to the notion of overconﬁdence studied
in this paper. The ﬁrst class analyzes the eﬀects of trader’s overconﬁdence in ﬁnancial
markets in a static context. For instance, Benos (1998), Kyle and Wang (1997) and Odean
(1998) show that increased overconﬁdence leads to greater expected trading volume and
greater price volatility. The second class studies the emergence of trader’s overconﬁdence in
ﬁnancial markets. For instance, Gervais and Odean (1997) study, in a dynamic setting, how
biases in learning generate overconﬁdence. In their model, individuals attribute good trades
to their ability and bad trades to chance. Thus, although overconﬁdence reduces expected
payoﬀs, rich traders tend to be overconﬁdent. A third class studies the consequences of
entrepreneurs’ overconﬁdence. For example, Manove (1995) shows that increased optimism
leads to lower expected utility and ineﬃcient allocation of resources in a growth model.
Manove and Padilla (1998) show that the coexistence of optimistic and realistic entrepreneurs
generates a screening problem for banks and leads to ineﬃcient allocation of credit.
3There are models that study optimism and other notions of overconﬁdence, but they are
unrelated to my work. One notion of optimism is that in Beaudry and Portier (1998). In
their model, agents observe a signal about an unknown productivity parameter and, if the
signal is high, the individual is optimistic. However, he knows the distribution of the signal.
In my model, the searcher is biased about the distribution. The second notion is that of self
fulﬁlling optimism, as in Kiyotaki (1988). In his model, if ﬁrms are optimistic about demand
and invest, demand is high in equilibrium, so there is no over-optimism. In my model, the
searcher is overly optimistic about the distribution. Another notion of overconﬁdence that
has been studied can be deﬁned as underestimation of volatility. For example, Alpert and
Raiﬀa (1982) document how people systematically construct too narrow conﬁdence intervals
for random variables.
2T h e M o d e l
For any topological space (X,T ) let C (X) denote the set of all bounded continuous
functions from X to R endowed with the sup norm. Also, let P (X) represent the set
of all probability measures on the Borel sets of X, endowed with the topology of weak
convergence. Let W ≡{ w1,w 2,...wn}⊂R+,w i t h0 <w 1 <w 2 <. . .<w n, and deﬁne
P2 (W)=P (P (W)). I will represent any g ∈ P (W) by (g1,...,gn),w h e r egi = g(wi).
At each date t the individual receives independent and identically distributed wage oﬀers
from W and must decide whether to accept the current proposal or continue sampling. His
objective is to maximize the expected discounted value of the oﬀer he accepts. Thus, his
decision depends on what he believes about future proposals. In most search models, it is
assumed that the searcher knows the exact distribution from which oﬀers are drawn. In this
paper, I relax this assumption and assume only that the individual has beliefs over the set of
possible distributions. Consequently, his beliefs are a distribution over probability measures,
which can be represented by a prior π ∈ P 2 (W).
As oﬀers arrive, the individual updates his priors according to Bayes’ rule. Let Ω=W∞
be the set of inﬁnite sequences of oﬀers. Also, for any oﬀer path ω ∈ Ω let ωt stand for the
ﬁrst t elements of ω and ωt for its tth element. Starting with beliefs π and after a history

















If ωt is a zero π-probability event, B (ωt,π) is arbitrary.
42.1 Optimal Search Behavior
In this section I ﬁnd the optimal policy for the searcher’s maximization problem. In order
to use dynamic programming to ﬁnd the optimal rule, I need to specify a state space and the
transition probabilities. In usual search models, the state space is the set of wage oﬀers and
the transition is given by the known distribution. Here, the state space must be extended to
account for varying beliefs, and the transition function will depend on the history of draws.
At each date in which search continues, the searcher has some beliefs, belonging to
P2 (W), and is faced with an oﬀer in W. If he has accepted a proposal, he receives oﬀers of 0
thereafter. Thus, let S ≡ P2 (W)×{W ∪{ 0}} be the state space of the searcher’s problem.





Since, π is a probability over distributions, mπ is the average distribution that an agent with
beliefs π expects to face. If beliefs are π and search continues, the only conceivable states
tomorrow are of the form (B (w,π),w),w i t hw ∈ W ⊂ R++, and their probabilities are
given by mπ (w). Analogously, if an oﬀer has been accepted, the only possible state is (π,0).
Then, the following measures over S describe the transitions:
Cπ [s]=





1 for s =( π,0)
0 otherwise
Cπ gives the subjective probability of each state tomorrow, given that beliefs today are π
a n ds e a r c hc o n t i n u e s ;Dπ gives the probabilities if an oﬀer has been accepted. Let A = {a,r}
be the action space, where r means that an oﬀer is rejected, and a indicates that an oﬀer is
accepted. For any state (π,w) and action c, deﬁne the transition q (·|(π,w),c) by
q(·|(π,w),c)=

Cπ if w ∈ W
Dπ if w =0or c = a
Given state (π,w), if the searcher chooses an action c, q (s| (π,w),c) gives the subjective
probability of state s in the following date. In the next period, an oﬀer is drawn, beliefs are
updated, the searcher chooses an action, and the process is repeated.
Deﬁne Ht =( S × A)
t−1×S. A policy is a sequence p = {pt}
∞
1 of functions such that pt :
Ht → A. For each policy p and ω ∈ Ω,l e tτ (p,ω) stand for the date when an oﬀer is accepted


















S y(s,)q(ds, | (π,w),r)
	
, y ∈ C (S),i s
a well deﬁned function K : C (S) → C (S). All proofs can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 1 For any y ∈ C (S), Ky ∈ C (S).
Since K is a contraction, it has a unique ﬁxed point in C (S). Moreover, the ﬁxed point
is the value function v.2 Deﬁne V (π) ≡

v[B (w,π),w]mπ (dw), the maximum value of
searching when beliefs are π. Then, in any state (π,w) ∈ S, accepting an oﬀer if and only if
w ≥ δV (π) (Optimal Policy)
is optimal. The optimal rule states that oﬀers greater than the maximum expected con-
tinuation value of searching, should be accepted. To see that the policy is in fact optimal,
recall from Corollary 2 in Denardo (1967) that an optimal policy exists. Then, let x(s)
be the expected return of following the above policy for one period and then following an
optimal policy, when starting in an arbitrary state s.S i n c ex(s)=v(s) and s was arbitrary,
following the rule in every period is optimal.
Note that this rule does not imply a reservation value rule. Assume, as in Kohn and
Shavell (1974), that a searcher believes that there are only two possible distributions. One
that assigns probability one to $1 and another with prob($2) = 1 − prob($3) = .01.I ft h e
ﬁrst draw is w =1 , the individual is certain that he will receive no higher oﬀers and accepts
the proposal. On the other hand, if he is patient and the ﬁrst draw is w =2 , he will reject
the oﬀer and wait for a draw of $3.
3 Dynamically Consistent Optimism and Behavior
In this section, I derive conditions that guarantee that optimistic searchers obtain a
higher subjective expected value of searching than pessimists after any history of draws.
This ensures that the optimal strategy is to search longer. As was shown by Bikhchandani
and Sharma (1996), a static deﬁnition of optimism is not suﬃcient to ensure longer search
times for the optimist. Because pessimists may have priors that are less aﬀected by updating
than optimists, downward updating can lead the initially optimistic searcher to stop sampling
before a pessimistic decision maker. I adopt their deﬁnition of optimism which ensures that
the optimistic individual assigns higher probabilities (than the pessimist) to high oﬀers after
2See Theorem 3 in Denardo (1967). The result is for bounded functions, but his proof, as well as the one
o fC o r o l l a r y2t ob eu s e dl a t e r ,a p p l i e st ob o u n d e da n dc o n t i n u o u sm a p s .
6any sequence of draws. Next I show that even this restriction does not necessarily yield
longer search times. Since individuals learn about the true distribution as oﬀers arrive,
proposals have informational value. If the total value of a low oﬀer exceeds that of a high
oﬀer, assigning high probabilities to high proposals may lead to a low value of searching.
To rule out this possibility, I deﬁne a property called Monotonicity which ensures that the
informational value of oﬀers is ordered in the same way as their monetary value. Finally, I
show that an optimistic searcher samples longer than a pessimist, whenever one of them has
monotonic priors.





u(w)h(dw), for all non decreasing functions u (Dubins and Savage,
1965). For static decision problems,  captures the idea of optimism. The following example,
which is similar to Example 1 in Bikhchandani and Sharma (1996), illustrates how diﬀerent
propensities to update may lead an optimistic individual to stop sampling before a pessimistic
searcher.
Example 1:L e tW = {1,2} and 1






and g =( 0 ,1). Also, deﬁne priors π,υ by υ(f)=1and π(g)=1
2 + q, π(h)=1
2 − q.
The posterior of the optimistic prior π is degenerate in h after receiving a draw of 1.
Thus, the optimistic searcher accepts the oﬀer of 1 in the ﬁrst period. Since he also accepts
ad r a wo f2 in any date, he stops sampling in the ﬁrst period in every oﬀer path. On the other
hand, the pessimistic searcher (with prior υ) never revises his priors and, for δ>2
3,c o n t i n u e s
sampling until a high draw occurs. Since the size of q indexes the degree of optimism, for all
levels of optimism and all oﬀer paths, the optimistic individual never samples longer than
the pessimistic searcher and sometimes samples less.
This result is driven by the fact that π is aﬀected by updating and υ is not, which causes
the order of optimism to be reversed with the arrival of information. In a sense, π is more
“stubborn” in the face of new information.
Equal Stubbornness: π,υ ∈ P 2 (W) are equally stubborn if and only if, mπ  mυ implies
mB(ωt,π)  mB(ωt,υ) for all t and all ω ∈ Ω.
Equal Stubbornness states that if one prior is statically more optimistic than another, the
relationship is maintained after receiving the same information. For example, two Dirichlet







3A Dirichlet with parameter π =( π1,π 2,...πn),w i t hπi > 0 for all i, is a probability measure over P (W).
Let S (π)=
n
1 πi,a n dµi = πi
S(π).T h e n mπ (wi)=µi and B (wi,π) is a Dirichlet with parameter π + ei
(where ei is the ith canonical vector). See De Groot (1970).
7To say that one prior is dynamically more optimistic than another, we need to restrict
attention to priors for which static optimism is preserved when the same information is
observed. The following deﬁnition is essentially the same as that in Bikhchandani and
Sharma (1996). Deﬁne the partial order  on P 2 (W) by π  υ if and only if mπ  mυ for
equally stubborn π,υ ∈ P 2 (W).I fπ  υ, I will say that π is more optimistic than υ.
The next example shows that even Equal Stubbornness is not suﬃcient to ensure that π
will search longer than υ when π  υ.
Example 2:L e t W = {2,4,5,6} and 1












and h =( 0 ,1 − (,(,0).







.B e c a u s eδ is close to 1, he samples until w =6is drawn and obtains an






. If the distribution
is h0 =( 0 ,1,0,0) however, the searcher accepts the ﬁrst oﬀer of 4 and obtains an expected
value of 4.
Deﬁne π,υ  ∈ P2 (W) by υ (g)=1− υ(h)=4
5 and π(j)=1− π (h)=1
2.I f
priors are π0, whenever w =2or w =6occur the searcher knows that the distribution
is j0.I f w =4is drawn, the distribution is h0. Thus, the value of searching when priors
are π0 is V (π0) ≈ 6+4
2 =5 . Analogously, V (υ0) ≈ 4
56+1
54 > 5 ≈ V (π0). That is, π0 is
more optimistic than υ0 and yields a smaller value of searching. This result is driven by the
fact that a draw of 4 signals a distribution with a value of 4,w h e r e a sw =2informs the
individual that the value of searching is close to 6.
Note that because 5 ∈ (δV (π0),δV (υ0)),i fw =5is drawn and priors are not up-
dated, the searcher with prior π0 accepts the oﬀer and the one with υ0 does not. However,
w =5is a zero probability event for both priors, so I will slightly modify them to ensure
that searchers can use Bayes’ rule. For any (,w h e nw =5is drawn, updating does not
change π or υ.T h e n 5 ∈ (δV (π0),δV (υ0)) guarantees that 5 ∈ (δV (π),δV (υ)) =
(δV (B (5,π )),δV (B (5,υ ))) for small enough (. Therefore, when w =5is drawn the op-
timistic searcher (with priors π) will accept the oﬀer and the pessimistic individual (with
beliefs υ) will reject it. Moreover, since V (π) <V(υ), an optimistic searcher obtains a
lower subjective expected value of searching than a pessimist.
In this example, an optimistic searcher stops sampling before a pessimist because a low
oﬀer has high informational value. That is, it is not true that high oﬀers are good news. I
now deﬁne a concept that formalizes this property.
Monotonicity: π ∈ P 2 (W) is monotonic if and only if, for all ω,κ ∈ Ω and t, ωt−1 = κt−1
8and ωt ≥ κt imply mB(ωt,π)  mB(κt,π).
That is, after observing high oﬀers, posteriors are statically more optimistic than after
receiving low oﬀers. Monotonicity ensures that the informational value of oﬀers is ordered in
the same manner as their monetary value. Dirichlet priors over multinomial distributions and
arbitrary priors over binomial distributions satisfy Monotonicity. This condition is similar
to those used by Bikhchandani and Sharma (1996), Burdett and Vishwanath (1988) and
Milgrom (1981). Unless otherwise stated, I will restrict attention to monotonic priors.
In Example 1 searchers have monotonic beliefs. Nevertheless, the failure of equal stub-
bornness allowed the statically optimistic agent to stop sampling before the pessimist. Ex-
ample 2 shows that if Monotonicity fails, the optimistic searcher may stop sampling before
the pessimist, even if they are equally stubborn. However, the following theorem shows that
Monotonicity and Equal Stubbornness ensure that the statically more optimistic searcher
samples longer in all oﬀer paths.
For any prior π and ω ∈ Ω,l e tτπ (ω) be the acceptance time, the date when an oﬀer is
accepted if the optimal policy is followed.
Theorem 2 Assume that π  υ and that either π or υ are monotonic. Then, for all ω ∈ Ω,
τπ (ω) ≥ τυ (ω).
Notice, again, that the theorem is not about average acceptance times, but about what
happens along all oﬀer paths. The idea behind this result is that the optimistic searcher be-
lieves that the future is good and thus reject oﬀers that the pessimist does not. Monotonicity
guarantees that high oﬀers are better than low oﬀers and Equal Stubbornness ensures that
the order of optimism is not reversed.
Corollary 1 in Bikhchandani and Sharma (1996) proves that, if priors satisfy the same
assumptions as in Theorem 2 and searchers follow a reservation wage policy, optimistic
searchers sample longer. However, since they concentrate on problems with no discounting,
Theorem 2 is not a generalization of their result.
4 Welfare Implications
In this model, the optimal search rule calls for accepting high oﬀers, so sampling continues
only if oﬀers are bad. Since searchers have non-degenerate priors and they update their beliefs
in each period, this feature of the model makes them become more pessimistic over time. In
this section I analyze the welfare consequences of this fact.
9Throughout, let f ∈ P (W) be the true measure that generates the oﬀers. I will say that
prior π is unbiased if and only if mπ = f and overconﬁdent if and only if mπ  f.L e t℘ be
the measure on Ω obtained by extending the probabilities that f induces on W T for all T.4






τπ(ω)ωτπ(ω)℘(dω), π ∈ P
2 (W)
As in standard search models, the rule that maximizes the true expected value of search-
ing is a stationary reservation wage policy. In addition, if a searcher is going to deviate from
the optimal policy just once, the longer he follows the optimal policy, the higher is his ex-
pected payoﬀ. Since there is a tendency for searchers to become pessimistic (and pessimistic
searchers accept low oﬀers) slightly overconﬁdent individuals follow the truly optimal policy
longer than unbiased searchers. As a consequence, in the following example an overconﬁdent
individual obtains a higher payoﬀ than an equally stubborn unbiased searcher.
Example 3:L e tW = {1,2}, 8
11 >δ>2






. Then, the policy that maximizes
the true expected value of searching is to reject oﬀers of 1 and accept the ﬁrst oﬀer of 2.












. Also, let π(h)=1− π(g)=3
4
and υ(h)=1− υ(g)=1
2. I will now show that the optimal search rule in this case calls for
rejecting oﬀers of 1 until the expected value of the next draw falls below 1
δ a n dt h e na c c e p t i n g
any oﬀer. If the continuation value of searching falls below 1
δ the agent accepts the current
oﬀer, so it suﬃces to show that whenever the expected value of the next draw falls below
1
δ, it is equal to the continuation value of searching. Suppose that the continuation value
of searching after an oﬀer of 1 is less than or equal to 1
δ. If the oﬀer is rejected and w =1
is drawn in the next period, the continuation value will be weakly smaller than it is today
which implies that the optimal strategy calls for accepting any oﬀer tomorrow. Therefore, if
the continuation value today is below 1
δ, it is equal to the expected value of the next draw.
Also, for enough draws of 1, the continuation value is close to that of a prior which assigns
probability one to w =1 . Thus, the continuation value eventually falls below 1
δ.F i n a l l y ,
since the expected value of the next draw is decreasing over time, whenever it falls below 1
δ
it must be the continuation value.
Since mB(1,υ)(1) = 5
8, the expected value of the next draw after observing w =1is 11
8 < 1
δ.
Thus, the unbiased searcher stops sampling in the ﬁrst period in any ω ∈ Ω and obtains
a true value of searching of 3
2.S i n c e mB(1,π)(1) = 1
2 the expected value of the next draw
after the ﬁrst bad draw is 3
2 > 1
δ. Therefore the overconﬁdent searcher rejects the ﬁrst low
4See the Kolmogorov Extension Theorem in Shiryayev (1984) p. 161.
10oﬀer, but because mB((1,1),π)(1) = 5
8 he accepts it in the second. This yields a true value of
searching of 1+δ 3
4 > 3
2.
In this example, the overconﬁdent searcher uses the true optimal strategy in period 1
whereas the unbiased does not. As a consequence, the overconﬁdent searcher is better oﬀ
when the true distribution is used to compute welfare. Note that it is not the case that for
some states of the world the overconﬁdent is better oﬀ (i.e. that he rejects a high oﬀer and
by chance he gets a higher oﬀer in the next period). His expected payoﬀ is larger than that
of the unbiased searcher.
4.1 The Beneﬁts of Overconﬁdence and Costs of Underconﬁdence.
This section provides a generalization of the last example. Consider the following three
features of the search model. First, the truly optimal search rule is a constant reservation
wage policy. Second, searchers become pessimistic as search evolves, so there is a tendency
for reservation wages to decrease. Third, overconﬁdent searchers tend to have higher reser-
vation wages than unbiased individuals. These features ensure that one can always ﬁnd
overconﬁdent searchers whose initial reservation wage is optimal and that, as search evolves,
make fewer mistakes (relative to the truly optimal search rule) than equally stubborn unbi-
ased searchers. This suggests that, when these conditions hold, overconﬁdent searchers are
better oﬀ than unbiased individuals. However, the following example shows that this is false
in general.







and δ = 58
1000. The truly optimal strategy
is to accept only oﬀers of 100. A searcher who follows the optimal strategy in period 1 and
then accepts any oﬀer obtains an expected payoﬀ of 100
3 + 206
9 δ. Rejecting only oﬀers of 1 in




Therefore, following the optimal strategy in the ﬁrst period is harmful. In the reminder of
















. Deﬁne the overconﬁdent prior π by
π(k)=1− π(g)=.98569 and the unbiased prior υ by υ(j)=1− υ(g)=.33266.I f
w =1 0 0has not occurred in periods 1 or 2, the expected value of the next draw is lower
than 1
δ for both searchers, so they stop sampling. Therefore, the searchers know in period 1
that oﬀers that yield a value smaller than the discounted expected value of the next draw
must be accepted. Since δEB(2,π)[w] > 2, the overconﬁdent searcher only accepts oﬀers of
100 in the ﬁrst period. Since 2 >δ E B(2,υ)[w]=δEB(1,υ)[w] > 1 the unbiased searcher only
11rejects oﬀers of 1 in the ﬁrst period.
The example illustrates the point that if the optimal policy is not going to be followed
tomorrow, it may not be optimal to follow it today. Therefore, although overconﬁdent
searchers may follow the optimal strategy more often than unbiased searchers, they are not
always better oﬀ. To ensure that overconﬁdent searchers will be better oﬀ, it suﬃces to
assume that searchers are not too patient. If they are impatient, the truly optimal policy is
to reject all oﬀers but the lowest. Then, because the individual receives in each period only
the worse news he could imagine, reservation wages are decreasing. This, in turn, ensures
that the only possible deviation (for a searcher who starts oﬀ with the optimal reservation
wage) is to accept any oﬀer. Consequently, when searchers are not too patient and start
oﬀ with the optimal reservation wage, they deviate from the optimal policy just once. This
guarantees that overconﬁdent searchers make exactly the same mistake as the unbiased
individuals, but in a later period, in which case overconﬁdent searchers are better oﬀ.
To formalize these arguments I ﬁrst show that, if an individual would accept the next to
lowest oﬀer to which he assigns positive probability, his reservation wage is decreasing.5
Lemma 3 Suppose that a searcher with prior π follows a reservation wage policy and that
w2 >δ V(π).T h e n ,δV (B (ωt−1,π)) ≥ δV (B (ωt,π)) for all ω ∈ Ω and all t.
Suppose that the optimal search rule calls for accepting w2 and rejecting oﬀers below
that. Assume also, that π in the previous lemma is overconﬁdent. Then, whenever π’s
search rule diﬀers from the optimal one, he is accepting oﬀers that he should not. Consider
an unbiased searcher with equally stubborn priors. By Theorem 2, the unbiased searcher
makes a mistake before the overconﬁdent and this makes him worse oﬀ. A similar reasoning
applies to show that underconﬁdent individuals are still worse oﬀ. This is summarized in
the following theorem. For any υ ∈ P2 (W),a n y(>0 and metric d,d e ﬁ n eN(υ) ≡
{π ∈ P 2 (W):d[π,υ] <( }.
Theorem 4 Deﬁne the prior υ0 by υ0 (f)=1 . Then, there exists δ such that, if δ>δ
i) for any (>0 there is an unbiased υ ∈ N(υ0) and an equally stubborn overconﬁdent π
for which V ℘(π) ≥ V ℘ (υ). Moreover, if f ([0,δV (υ0))) > 0, V ℘(π) >V℘(υ)
ii) there exists γ>0 such that for all unbiased ν ∈ Nγ (υ0) that follows a reservation wage
policy, if ϕ is an equally stubborn underconﬁdent prior, V ℘(ν) ≥ V ℘(ϕ)
5Bikhchandani and Sharma (1996) provide suﬃcient conditions on priors to ensure that searchers follow
reservation wage rules.
12Theorem 4 says that there exists an unbiased searcher who is almost certain about the
truth and an overconﬁdent searcher with equally stubborn priors who is better oﬀ. Second,
it is overconﬁdence, and not an arbitrary bias, that makes the overconﬁdent searchers better
oﬀ. Underconﬁdent searchers are still worse oﬀ.
4.2 The Costs of Overconﬁdence
Theorem 4 shows that overconﬁdent searchers are sometimes better oﬀ than unbiased
decision makers. In this section I examine the reasons why the converse may hold. The ﬁrst
reason why overconﬁdence can be harmful is the one illustrated in Example 4: following the
optimal policy more often than not, is not always beneﬁcial. The second is the obvious one:
overconﬁdent searchers may reject high oﬀers that they should accept. However, since it
is easy to construct examples where overconﬁdent searchers with large biases are better oﬀ
than unbiased searchers, the condition that searchers are stubborn (and keep making their
original mistakes) needs to be added.
Consider an individual with priors υ close to the degenerate υ0.B yc o n t i n u i t yo fV (see
Corollary 10) one can make sure that, for almost any discount factor, the search rule of υ
resembles that of υ0 for a long period of time. Therefore, discounting ensures that V ℘,t h e
true value of searching, is continuous at υ0. Then, for υ and π close to the degenerate υ0 and
π0 respectively, V ℘(υ0) >V℘ (π0) guarantees V ℘ (υ) >V℘ (π). The result is summarized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 5 Fix any degenerate priors π0 and υ0. Assume f (δV (υ0)) = 0, f (δV (π0)) = 0
and V ℘(υ0) >V℘ (π0). Then, there exists ( such that for all π ∈ N(π0) and υ ∈ N (υ0),
V ℘(υ) >V℘(π).
The third reason why overconﬁdent searchers may obtain lower payoﬀs than unbiased
searchers is that reservation wages may be increasing for some oﬀer paths. When reservation
wages increase, even slightly overconﬁdent decision makers will reject oﬀers that they should
accept. Although in general reservation wages do not increase, the following example shows
that for some oﬀer paths, reservation wages may be increasing.















.A l s o ,f o r1 ≥ ( ≥ 0, deﬁne priors π by π(g)=1− π(j)=(.
Since δ is close to 1, a searcher with beliefs π0 accepts only oﬀers of 3 and 4.T h u s ,f o r
( suﬃciently small, the same is true for a searcher with beliefs π. Suppose that some oﬀer
path ω starts with t draws of w =2 .B e c a u s eg(2) >j(2), for suﬃciently large t, B (ωt,π)
13assigns probability close to 1 to g. Consequently, for suﬃciently large t, the searcher accepts
only oﬀers of 4.
Therefore, the searcher with priors π accepts oﬀers of 3 at the beginning of the search
process, but after enough draws of 2, he only accepts proposals of w =4 . The reservation
w a g ei n c r e a s e sb e c a u s ea no ﬀ e rt h a ti sr e j e c t e da tt h es t a r to ft h es e a r c hp r o c e s s( i . e .al o w
oﬀer) signals a good distribution.6
Adding an appropriate true distribution to this example, it is easy to show that overcon-
ﬁdent searchers may be worse oﬀ than some unbiased individuals.
5 Evolution of Beliefs
In this section I give conditions that guarantee that true average posteriors diminish over
time for overconﬁdent priors. I ﬁrst show that, although unbiased priors remain unbiased,
overconﬁdent beliefs may become pessimistic. Then I show that, if there is an unbiased belief
that is equally stubborn than the overconﬁdent prior, the bias diminishes over time and the
overconﬁdent does not become pessimistic on average.





That is, on average, unbiased searchers remain unbiased. The following example shows,
however, that an overconﬁdent prior may become pessimistic on average.













j =( 0 ,0,1). Deﬁne priors π by π(g)=π(j)=1
2. Since only oﬀers of 1 and 2 will occur,






. Thus, although π is overconﬁdent, he becomes





In the example, there does not exist an unbiased belief that is equally stubborn than
















= mB(2,π), violating equal stubbornness. That is, while 2 is good news for υ,i ti s
“very” bad news for π, and that causes their order of optimism to be reversed. If there was
an equally stubborn unbiased belief, π would remain optimistic on average. The reason is
that the average posterior of the unbiased belief is a lower bound for the average posterior
of π. Since the unbiased prior remains unbiased on average, the overconﬁdent remains
overconﬁdent. The following theorem is a generalization of the previous argument.
6In Burdett and Vishwanath (1988) this possibility is ruled out assuming that the cost of search is large,
which ensures that only “very” low oﬀers are rejected.
14Proposition 6 Fix any prior π such that there exist an equally stubborn unbiased belief. If

















 mπ, for all t.
Proposition 6 states that, for overconﬁdent priors for which there is an equally stubborn
unbiased belief, the true average posteriors decrease but never fall below the truth. They
decrease because updating is, essentially, averaging priors and the information received and
oﬀers are generated by a distribution that is lower than beliefs in ﬁrst order stochastic sense.
The overconﬁdent beliefs do not fall below the truth because they are bounded below by the
unbiased priors, which are a martingale.
A corollary of Proposition 6 is that beliefs are a martingale for unbiased priors. That
is, the agent’s true average beliefs about the distribution that generates the oﬀers does not
change over time. This is not the usual “beliefs are a martingale” claim of the literature
on learning as, for example, in Kalai and Lehrer (1993). In that literature, the relevant
distribution with respect to which the expectation is taken is mπ. Hence, in that context,
“beliefs are a martingale” means that one can not expect any change in his beliefs. Here,
the distribution with respect to which the expectation is taken, is the true measure f.T h u s ,
the result is a statement about the true, and not subjective, evolution of beliefs.
6 Concluding Remarks
One can apply the results on behavior and evolution of beliefs to obtain a testable impli-
cation of overconﬁdence. Suppose that the search problem was to be repeated a number of
times, called spells, and that each problem were solved myopically. Assume, also, that the
searcher starts each spell with equally stubborn priors. In addition, following Proposition 6,
suppose that the overconﬁdent’s prior at the beginning of today’s spell are dominated by his
beliefs at the start of the last spell. Then, Theorem 2 ensures that the expected search times
decrease from spell to spell. On the other hand, an analogous construction for unbiased
searchers yields constant spell lengths. Hence, one may be able to test whether people are
overconﬁdent through the analysis of search behavior of unemployed workers.
The results on welfare may also have implications for social policy. For example, consider
the case of an unemployment insurance oﬃce. Since the welfare loss in Theorem 5 is derived
exclusively from beliefs, policymaking only makes sense if the government knows more about
the true distribution than searchers. The unemployment insurance oﬃce observes the same
characteristics of the worker as the ﬁrm does and has been continuously receiving information
15about job oﬀers for a long time. Then, if it can be assumed to know the distribution that the
unemployed worker will face, inducing workers, for example, to take jobs they do not want
to accept, may be welfare enhancing. In traditional information economics models, where
the individual knows more about himself than the oﬃce, inducing workers to take jobs is
welfare decreasing.
The results on welfare also suggest that one can build models where the pervasiveness
of overconﬁdence is the consequence of evolutionary selection. In pre-agricultural societies
subsistence depended on search activities, such as hunting and gathering. Thus, if overconﬁ-
dent searchers were better oﬀ than unbiased searchers, and that favored their reproduction,
their progeny should tend to be overconﬁdent.
In closing, I note that all the results of the paper, except those on welfare, can be easily
extended to the case of arbitrary W ⊂ R.
7 APPENDIX




y(x)µ(dx) for all y ∈ C (X).F o r µ ∈ P (X) and measurable h : X → R,d e ﬁ n e
µh−1 (C)=µ(h−1 (C)) for all measurable C. The following is a corollary to theorem 5.5 in
Billingsley (1968)
Lemma 7 Let {µn},µ ∈ P (X), h : X → R be continuous and hn : X → R,c o n v e r g e
uniformly to h as n →∞ .T h e n ,µn ⇒ µ implies µnh−1
n ⇒ µh−1
Lemma 8 B (w,·):P2 (W) → P2 (W) is continuous.
Proof:F i xa n yy ∈ C (P (W)). I have to show that πn ⇒ π implies

P(W)






















suﬃces to show that πnh−1
n ⇒ πh−1.S i n c ehn converges uniformly to h,c o n t i n u i t yo fh and
Lemma 7 will complete the proof.
By ﬁniteness of W, for arbitrary wi, gn ⇒ g implies gn(wi) → g(wi). This, and con-
tinuity of y guarantee that |y(gn)gn (w) − y(g)g(w)|→0. Noting that |h(gn) − h(g)| =
|y(gn)gn (w) − y(g)g(w)|[mπ (w)]
−1 completes the proof.
16Lemma 9 For {πn}
∞
1 ,π∈ P2 (W),

W




if y ∈ C (S) and πn ⇒ π.
Proof: Lemma 8 and ﬁniteness of W, guarantee that hn (w) ≡ y(B (w,πn),w) converges
uniformly in w to h(w) ≡ y(B (w,π),w). In addition, mπn ⇒ mπ, so Lemma 7 completes
the proof.
Proof of 1: Proofs of continuity when search has stopped and of boundedness are trivial







Lemma 9 completes the proof.
Using continuity of v, we obtain the following trivial corollary.
Corollary 10 V : P2 (W) → P 2 (W) is continuous.
Lemma 11 Assume that π  υ and that either π or υ are monotonic. Then, for all t and
ω ∈ Ω,V(B (ωt,π)) ≥ V (B (ωt,υ))
Proof: I will say that y ∈ C (S) is non decreasing if y(π,w) ≥ y(υ,w) whenever π  υ and
either π or υ are monotonic. Let N (S) ⊂ C (S) be the set of non decreasing functions on S.
Since K maps N (S) into itself and N (S) is closed, the value function v is non decreasing.
If υ is monotonic, V (π) ≥

v[B (w,υ),w]mπ (dw) ≥ VT (υ). The ﬁrst inequality follows
from equal stubbornness and non decreasingness of v. The second, because v[B (w,υ),w]
is non decreasing in w for monotonic priors. The result follows because monotonicity and
equal stubborness are preserved by updating. For monotonic π the proof is symmetric.
P r o o fo f2 : Given the optimal policy, V (B (ωt,π)) ≥ V (B (ωt,υ)) for all t and ω ∈ Ω will
complete the proof. The result follows from Lemma 11.
P r o o fo f3 :G i v e nt h a tw2 >δ V(π), in the ﬁrst period, search continues only if the ﬁrst




, π  B (w1,π).S i n c e
π and B (w1,π) are equally stubborn, Lemma 11 ensures that δV (π) ≥ δV (B (w1,π)).
Then, w2 >δ V(π) ≥ δV (B (w1,π)). Hence, in period 2, search continues only if w1,
occurs. Again, B (w1,π)  B (w1,w 1,π) and they are equally stubborn, so δV (B (w1,π)) ≥
δV (B (w1,w 1,π)). Continuing in this manner, the result follows.
Lemma 12 For any Dirichlet π =( π1,π 2,...,πn), w1 = δV (π) implies V (π)=

wmπ (dw)
17Proof:S i n c e w1 >δ V(B (w1,π)) implies that V (π)=

wmπ (dw), it will suﬃce to
show that V (π) >V(B (w1,π)). Then, V (π) ≥

max{w,δV (B ((w1,w 1),π))}mπ (dw) >
V (B (w1,π)). The ﬁrst inequality follows from B (w,π)  B ((w1,w 1),π), equal stubborn-
ness and Lemma 11. The second, because max{w,δV (B ((w1,w 1),π))} is strictly increasing
and π  B (w1,π).
P r o o fo f4 : Trivially, for any f there exists δ s u c ht h a tf o ra l lδ>δ , w2 >δ V(υ0). Then,
ii) follows directly from Theroem 2, Corollary 13 and Lemma 3.
To prove i) I will ﬁnd Dirichlet priors for unbiased and overconﬁdent searchers. For s>0,








. For small γ>0,l e tfγ ∈ P (W)
be deﬁned by fγ =( f1 − γ,f2 + γ,...,fn) and let αγ be degenerate in fγ.F o r a l l γ>0,
V (αγ) >V(υ0),s oc o n t i n u i t yo fV guarantees that for small γ, δV

αγ
∈ (δV (υ0),w 2).










Then, continuity of B and of V guarantee that there exists an S such that for all s<S ,
δV (B (w2,π s)) ∈ (δV (υ0),w 2). Hence, for all s<S , πs satisﬁes the conditions of Lemma
3. This implies that πs will never reject an oﬀer that he should not. Thus, for all t,a l l
ω and s<S , δV (B (ωt,π s)) ≥ δV (B (ωt,υ s)). So, to show that some overconﬁdent is
strictly better oﬀ than some unbiased, it suﬃces to prove that for some history with positive
probability, the searcher with priors υs accepts w1 and πs rejects it.
Let wt
1 denote a sequence of t draws of w1. Then, for all t, ℘{ω : ωt = wt
1} > 0. It will
suﬃce to show that for some s and some t, δV (B (wt
1,υs)) ≤ w1 <δ V(B (wt
1,π s)).
Fix s1 <S . Since, for large enough t, B (wt
1,υs1) is close to a degenerate belief in a
distribution that is degenerate in w1,c o n t i n u i t yo fV implies that δV (B (wt
1,υ s1)) <w 1.
Then, δV (B (wt
1,υ0)) >w 1 and continuity of V and B guarantee that for some s2 <s 1,
δV (B (wt









≤ V (B (wt
1,πs2)). Letting π = πs2 and υ = υs2 completes the proof.
For each r ∈ [0,1],l e trx denote the true value of following the policy “in time t,i fi n
the dyadic expansion of r the tth element is a 1, accept w iﬀ w ≥ x.I ft h etth element is a
0, accept iﬀ w>x ”. If r has two expansions, the choice between them is irrelevant.
Lemma 13 For degenerate π0 ∈ P2 (W), V ℘ is continuous at π0 iﬀ 0δV (π0) =1 δV (π0)
Proof: I will ﬁrst show suﬃciency. Assume that 1δV(π0) =0 δV (π0). It is easy to see, by
induction, that for all T,t h a ti fq,r ∈ [0,1] have a constant string of 0’s or 1’s after T,
qδV (π0) = rδV (π0). B yc o n t i n u i t yo fV ,f o rﬁ x e dγ>0 and T<∞,Ic a nc h o o s e(>0 so
that for all π ∈ N(π0),a l lt ≤ T and ω ∈ Ω, V (B (ωt,π)) ∈ Nγ (V (π0)). Then, for every
18ω ∈ Ω there exists some r(ω) ∈ [0,1] with 1δV (π0) = r(ω)δV (π0), such that the choices made
by a searcher with prior π who follows the optimal strategy are the same as those dictated
by r(ω) for t ≤ T. Note that for all ω and ω’, the r’s chosen are such that r(ω)δV (π0) =
r(ω’)δV (π0) =1 δV (π0) ≡ rδV (π0). Then, I get |V ℘(π0) − V ℘(π)| =
 rδV(π0) − V ℘ (π)
  ≤ δ
Twn.
Noting that T was arbitrary completes the proof of suﬃciency.
Assume 1δV (π0) =0 δV (π0) and let π0 be degenerate in (q1,q 2...qn) ∈ P (W).S i n c e qi =
δV (π0) for some i<n ,l e tπs be degenerate in (q1...,qi − (s,...,qn + (s) for (s ↓ 0. Then, for
all s, V (πs) >V(π0) and for large s, |V ℘(π0) − V ℘(πs)| =

1δV (π0) − 0δV (π0)

 =0
Proof of 5: {V (υ0),V (π0)}∩{ w : f (w) > 0} = φ ensures that the condition for Lemma
13 is met, so V ℘ is continuous both at π0 and υ0.
Proof of 6 : The part of overconﬁdence will be proved by induction. The other is analogous
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